Monday, February 8, 2016

Olga Tellis and Others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Others 1986 AIR(SC) 180, 1985 INDLAW SC 161

    It was popularly known as pavement dwellers case a five judge bench of the court has finally ruled that the word life in Article 21 includes the right to livelihood also. The court said:
It does not mean merely that life cannot be distinguished or taken away as, for example, by imposition or execution of death sentence, except according to the procedure established by law. This is one aspect of right to livelihood because no person can live without right to livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person right to life is depriving him of means of livelihood. In view of the fact that Art. 39(a) and 41 require the state to secure to the citizen an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work; it would be sheer pendentary to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life.
In that case the petitioners had challenged the validity of sections 313, 313A, 314 and 497 of Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1888 which empowered the municipal authorities to remove their huts from the pavement and public places on the ground that their removal amounted to depriving of their right to livelihood and hence violative of Art. 21. While agreeing that their right to livelihood is included in Art. 21 the court held that it can be curbed or curtailed by the following just and fair procedure.


Razia Begum vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum AIR 1958 AP 195

Facts: The   appellant filed a suit against the third respondent for the declaration that she was his lawfully married wife and is entitled to receive from him Rs. 2,000/- per month as Kharche Pandan. The third respondent filed his written statement admitting the claim, but on the same date respondents 1 and 2 made an application under 0. 1, R.10(2), of the Code of Civil  Procedure for being  impleaded  in the suit as defendants on the grounds that  they were respectively the wife and son of  the  third respondent,  that  they were  interested  in  denying the appellant’s status as wife and the status of her children is the  legitimate children of the third respondent, that the suit was the result of a collusion between the appellant and the third respondent and that if the appellant was  declared to  be lawfully wedded to the third respondent, the  rights and  interests of respondents 1 and 2 in the estate  of  the 3rd respondent would be affected.  The application was contested by both the appellant and the third respondent.
The lower Court has held that respondents 1 and 2 are proper parties to the suit, so the petitioner filed the revision petition.
Issue: whether respondents 1 and 2 are interested parties in the subject of litigation which the petitioner claims in the suit?
Analysis: O. 1, R. 10, Code of Procedure states that the Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, order that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary, in order to enable the court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit i.e. it includes both necessary and proper parties. Necessary parties are parties who ought to have been joined, i.e. parties necessary for the constitution of the suit without whom no decree at all can be passed. Proper parties are those whose presence enables the Court to adjudicate more effectually and completely the questions involved in the suit. The object of the provision is that the real dispute raised in the suit should be decided in the presence of all the parties interested in the dispute and for that purpose, they should be brought before the Court in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and there should be affectual and complete adjudication of the dispute.
In Secretary of State v. Murugesa Mudaliar, a new party can implead as a defendant even against the plaintiff’s consent in a fit and proper case as it is not fair to give the judgement without the presence of the parties which are important to the case and a decision will impact them in a way.
When a marriage is proved valid, it is valid for all purposes like the social status, property, legitimacy of children etc. The declaration may not confer on the petitioner any present interest in the property of the 3rd respondent but does confer on herself and her children certain legal rights -the right to succeed the father, during their minority they have a right to be maintained by their father. The declaration which the petitioner seeks, thus carries with it very important legal incidents. Respondents 1 and 2, as the lawful wife and the legitimate child, will have similar rights as the petitioner and her children will have so in this case the 3rd respondent predeceases the 2nd respondent intestate, his share in the estate of his father will be affected ( it will be reduced).
So it would be unfair that the persons who are so closely related to the 3rd respondents be denied the opportunity of contesting the status of the petitioner as a wife. It would also enlarge the scope of the action or even to change the nature of the suit.
Thus court dismissed the civil revision petition.


Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 SCR (1) 814Summary

Facts 
Shamsher Singh, subordinate judge
 – 
 services terminated by order of theGovernment of Punjab in the name of the Governor, without reasons 
Ishwar Chand Agarwal
 – 
 services terminated by Government of Punjab inthe name of the Governor on recommendation of HC
ContentionsAPPELLANTS:-

the Governor as the Constitutional or the formal head of the State canexercise powers and functions of appointment and removal of membersof the Subordinate Judicial Service only
personally-

SardariLal v. union of India &Ors. (1971)3 S.C.R. 461 where it has beenheld that where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, ifsatisfied, makes an order under Article 311(2) proviso(c) that in theinterest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an enquiryfor dismissal or removal or reduction in rank of an officer, the satisfactionof the President or the Governor is his personal satisfaction. Therefore,under Article 234 of the Constitution the appointment as well as thetermination of services of subordinate Judges is to be made by theGovernor personally-

Reasons: 
First there are several constitutional functions, powers and dutiesof the Governor 
. These are conferred on him eo nomine (“by thatname”) the Governor. The Governor, is, by and under the
Constitution, required to act in his discretion in several matters.
These constitutional functions and powers of the Governor eonomine as well as these in the discretion of the Governor arenot executive powers of the State within the meaning of Article


154 read with Article 162

Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India

Facts: On the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India the petitioners including Minerva Mills Ltd. and some creditors challenged the legality of order for taking over the management of textile undertaking of petitions. The writ petition had also included the validity of Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974.
A Central Government appointed Committee made a full and complete investigation of the affairs of the Minerva Mills Ltd. and after investigation the Central Government authorized National Textile Corporation to take over the management of the undertaking of the company.
Issues: (1) Whether there was justification for taking over the management of the undertaking of the company under section 18A of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951?
(2) Whether there was foundation for the finding of the Central Government that where the undertaking of the company was being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, the Government could not sanction a guarantee in such issues?
Decision: It was held that where the management of a textile undertaking which was being run in loss and had to be closed down was taken over by the Central Government after conducting enquiry on the ground that the affairs of the undertaking were being managed in a manner highly detrimental to public interest, the decision to take over the management would not be open to challenge on the ground that prior to taking over of the management, the State Government had given financial assistance to the undertaking especially when the decision to take over the management was not challenged before any court of law.
It was further held that Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1956 could not be said to damage the basic structure of the Constitution.


Indra Sawhney vs Union Of India & Others – Indian Kanoon Citation: AIR 1993 SC 477, 1992 Supp 2 SCR 454

Introduction:   When the topic of reservation is in light, this is one case that necessarily needs to be discussed and mentioned about. This was the case where the concept of creamy layer was formed.
Facts of the case:
1.    In the beginning KAKA KALEKAR’s commission was formed which had submitted the report containing lists of people of backward caste.
2.    But the then government did not accept it and soon in the later elections Mrs.Indira Gandhi came to power.
3.    In the mean time MANDAL commission formed another report about the lists of the backward classes in the country but was not implemented by then prime minister Indira Gandhi.
4.    Only when JANATA party came to power as a part of the political strategy the then PM V.P. Singh issued memorandum of reserving 27% of seats for socially and backward classes.
5.    This led to civil disturbance in the country. Questions were raized on the actions of the government. The BAR association of supreme court filed a writ petition questioning the basis of the memorandum issued by the government.
6.    The case was supposed to be decide by 5 judges but in the mean time due to frequent political changes the then PM P.V. Narshima Rao issued another memorandum making to subsequent changes. Viz- introducing the economic factor while deciding the reservation criterion and increased 10% of reservation totalling upto 37%
7.    Therefore the case was reffered to 9 bench judge in the apex court.

Issues:
1.    Whether article 16(4) supercedes article 16(1)?
2.    Whether the extent of reservation can exceed 50%?
3.    Whether there are further classifications in the already classified backward class?
Judgement:
Article 16(4) is not an exception, rather is a part of (1). The list is not exhaustive in nature and shall be subject to alteration in different respects along with the need of the society.

In no manner shall the reservation exceed 50% of the criterion. During the reservation policies the creamy layer shall be neccasarily excluded.they are not similar to socially and educationally backward class in 15(4). There lies no reservation in promotions.

• CASE- MANEKA GANDHI vs UNION OF INDIA • Equivalent Citations- 1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621

FACTS OF THE CASE-
The factual summary of this case is as follows-
·         Maneka Gandhi was issued  a passport on 1/06/1976 under the Passport Act 1967. The regional passport officer, New Delhi, issued  a letter dated 2/7/1977 addressed to Maneka Gandhi, in which she was asked to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c) of the Act in public interest, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter.
·         Maneka Gandhi immediately wrote a letter to the Regional Passport officer, New Delhi seeking in return a copy of the statement of reasons for such order. However, the government of India, Ministry of External Affairs refused to produce any such reason in the interest of general public.
·         Later, a writ petition was filed by Maneka Gandhi under Article 32 of the Constitution in the Supreme Court challenging the order of the government of India as violating her fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.

ISSUES OF THE CASE-
The main issues of this case were as follows-
1.    Whether right to go Abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
  1. Whether the Passport Act prescribes a ‘procedure’ as required by Article 21 before depriving a person from the right guaranteed under the said article.
3.    Whether section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act is violative of Article 1419(1) (a) and 21 of the constitution.
4.    Whether the impugned order of the Regional passport officer is in contravention of the principle of natural justice.

JUDGEMNT OF TEH CASE- 
·         To the extent to which section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967 authorises the passport authority to impound a passport “in the interest of the general public”, it is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution since it confers vague and undefined power on the passport authority.
·         Section 10(3)(c) is void as conferring an arbitrary power since it does not provide for a hearing to the holder of the passport before the passport is impounded.
·         Section 10(3)(c) is violative of Article 21 of the Constitution since it does not prescribe ‘procedure’ within the meaning of that article and the procedure practiced is worst.
·         Section 10(3)(c) is against Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) since it permits restrictions to be imposed on the rights guaranteed by these articles even though such restrictions cannot be imposed under articles 19(2) and 19(6).

·         A new doctrine of post decisional theory was evolved.

Leading cases


SYLLEBUS
PAPER IV
1.      KESHVANAND BHARTI VS THE STATE OF KERALA AIR 1973 SC 1461
2.      OLGA TELLIS & OTHERS VS UNION OF INDIA AIR 1986  SC 180
3.      MENKA GANDHI VS UNION OF INDIA AIR  1978 SC 597
4.      DR. PREETI SRIVASTAV VS STATE OF MP  AIR 1999 SC 2894
5.      INDRA SAWHNEY VS UNION OF INDIA AIR 1993 SC 477
6.      A.K. KARIPAK UNION OF INDIA AIR 1970 SC 150
7.      PNB VS KUNJ BIHARI MISHRA AIR 1998 SC 2713
8.      DIRECT RECUIT CLASS II EMPLOYES OFFICER ASSOCIATION VS STATE OF MAHARASTRA AIR 1990 SC 1607
9.      STATE OF KARNATAKA VS UMA DEVI AIR 2006 SC 1806
10.  AJAY HASIA VS KHALID MUJIB SEHRA VARDI AIR 1981 SC 487
11.